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IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION IN MULTIPLE-PARTY SUITS
Except in rare situations,' the courts in any state can exercise personal
jurisdiction over only those individuals who are citizens of or found in that state
or havesuch contacts in that state "that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "2In most twoparty actions this rule is sufficiently flible to provide a plaintiff with at least
one state in which he can obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant. However, in actions where the plaintiff must obfain personal jurisdiction over two
or more parties, he may find that there is no single state in which they are all
subject to in personam jurisdiction. This comment discusses this jurisdictional
problem and possible solutions for it.
I
A prospective plaintiff with a cause of action against two or more persons
can obtain legal relief when the dispute is over the title to land, ' when a single
state can exercise personal jurisdiction over all potential defendants, or if in a
suit against one defendant the others would not be considered "indispensable."
If, howevr, the potential defendants are "indispensable," 4 the plaintiff may
1 The federal courts have power to exercise a more extensive in personam jurisdiction when
authorized by federal statute, e.g., Federal Interpleader Act, 62 Stat. 391 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A.
§1335 (1950); Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 4(f).
2 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The "minimum contacts" test sets the constitutional limits to the in personam jurisdiction of states. Before a
state court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a person outside the state who is not a citizen
of that state it must be authorized by state legislation to serve such individual or corporation
with process. For the purposes of this comment it will be assumed that all states have legislation enabling them to exercise personal jurisdiction in all cases in which they constitutionally
may do so. This assumption is probably untrue of any state. Even the recently expanded
Illinois statute does not seem to cover the cause of action arising from faulty goods transported into the state. That act provides: "Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of
this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said
acts: (a) The transaction of any business within this State; (b) The commission of a tortious
act within this State; (c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time
of contracting." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 110, §17.

3See Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 620
(1954), where the author argues that full faith and credit should be given to foreign decrees
ordering conveyance of real property.
4 Since Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), it is probable that state law governs the determination of which parties are "indispensable" to an action in both state and federal courts.
But see 3 Moore, Federal Practice §19.07 (2nd ed., 1948). The rule laid down by the Supreme
Court in the landmark case of Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. (U.S.) 129 (1854), is still widely
cited as authority. In that case indispensable parties were defined as those "[p]ersons who not
only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and in good conscience."
Id., at 136. Under the indispensable party doctrine the courts attempt to minimize hardships
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not proceed against them separately; if no state can exercise personal jurisdiction over all of them, the plaintiff can not obtain legal relief.5 The person who
desires to enforce a claim held jointly with another who refuses to sue is in a
similar predicament.6 If the other party is indispensable to the suit and no
state can exercise jurisdiction over both him and the proposed defendant, it will
7
be very difficult for the plaintiff fo obtain legal relief.
A partial solution to the joinder problems would be effected by abandonment
of the indispensable party concept; thereby each plaintiff could proceed alone
against each defendant. However, not only would this fail in many cases to provide a desirable one-action remedy for plaintiffs with a joint claim against many
defendants, but it would increase the number of situations where defendants
are forced to defend their rights against multiple plaintiffs in separate suits.
Under present law the latter situation occurs, for example, when a person holds
confested title to all mindral rights in a tract of land., If the tract is divided
into individually owned separate lots, the owner of the mineral rights is faced
with as many potential suits as there are lots, for in a suit by one of the lot
owners against the owner of the mineral rights his claim does not conflict with
the claims of the other lot owners and therefore those parties are not indispensable and cannot involuntarily be joined in the action.9 Such situations are
to the parties in situations where the jurisdictional limitations make it possible to pass judgment binding on all the interested parties. It is clear that in some cases the courts' decisions
produce more hardship than they alleviate. See, e.g., Carroll v. New York Life Ins. Co., 94
F.2d 333, 335 (C.A.8th, 1938).
5
It might be possible for the plaintiff to wait for the absent defendant to pass through the
state and then to serve process on him. For a discussion of the unfairness of subjecting a person
who is only traveling through the state to the personal jurisdiction of that state, seeEhrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65
Yale L. J. 289 (1956), where the author makes the questionable argument that there is no
historical basis in the common law for the exercise of this jurisdiction. See also, Foster, Place of
Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 41
(1930), where it is suggested that the unfairness of exercising jurisdiction over a transient
could be eliminated without depriving the plaintiff of a forum by the courts' dismissal of these
actions conditioned on the defendants making themselves available at a more convenient
forum.
6
E.g., in McAulay v. Moody, 185 Fed. 144 (C.C.Ore., 1911), where one of three joint
owners of a promissory note sued the maker, a resident of Oregon, in an Oregon district court
the action was dismissed because of the absence of the third owner, an indispensable party
residing in Montana who refused to join in the action.
7Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 19(a) states that "when a person who should join as a plaintiff
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff."
Unless there is a similar procedural rule for the courts in the state where the plaintiff in this
situation sues he might lack the means for obtaining legal relief even if the absent party is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction.
8 This factual situation was presented in Estes v. Shell Oil Co., 234 F.2d 847 (C.A.Sth,
1956), where one of the lot owners sued for what he claimed was his share of the proceeds for oil
which the defendant had pumped out of the ground over a twenty-year period.
9 There is no provision in either the federal or state courts for a defendant to join nonindispensable plaintiffs to an action. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 2 0(a). By seeking declaratory
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unfortunate, for the defendant who must defend multiple suits will lose much of
the value of his property. Although it is usually true that the indispensable
party concept has little value, in these situations it serves the useful purpose of
limiting suits. 10
If, in the example given in the preceding paragraph, the claims to the property are conflicting, the defendant can protect his property in one action by
initiating suit in the nature of interpleader." Assuming diversity of citizenship,
if all the claimants do not have sufficient contact in any one state to justify
personal jurisdiction of a state court, 12 the action may be commenced in a federal court; for under the Federal Interpleader Act 3 an exception was made to
the rules of personal jurisdiction of the federal courts and the federal district
courts exercise nation-wide in personam jurisdiction.
Unfortunately the Interpleader Act may have caused more problems than
it solved when it coupled its nation-wide service of process with extremely
lenient jurisdictional and venue requirements. If there is any diversity of
citizenship among the claimants and if the amount in controversy exceeds $500,
suit may be brought in any state where one of the claimants resides. While protecting the stakeholder from multiple liability, the Act gives the claimants almost no protection against inconvenient litigation, and an Oregon citizen might
well have to assert his claim in Florida.
While the interpleader action is designed to protect the stakeholder against
multiple liabilify, the impleader device serves a comparable purpose in safeguarding the defendant who, although liable to the plaintiff, is not ultimately
liable for the amount in controversy. The device, for example, enables a party
to an automobile accident to ensure that if he is held liable in a tort action by
the injured person, his liability insurer will not escape responsibility by successfully denying, in a second suit, his liability to the plaintiff. By impleading the insurance company into the first suit the question of his liability will be adjudijudgments initially or by cross-claims the defendant can limit the number of suits to the number of different states in which claimants reside. Moreover, if the defendant wins the first suit,
prospective claimants may well be deterred from litigating.
10 Another situation in which the "indispensable party" concept plays a useful role is
where one of the beneficiaries of a trust sues the trustees either for his share of the res or for an
accounting, claiming mismanagement. When the other beneficiaries can justifiably be made
"indispensable" to the action, the trustee is protected from multiple suits by the beneficiaries.
Brown v. Christman, 126 F.2d 625 (App.D.C., 1942).
11In an action "in the nature of interpleader" the stakeholder, who holds the disputed sum
of money, claims the sum for himself. In the strict interpleader action the stakeholder claims
no part of the res. Under present law there is no difference between these two actions for
jurisdictional purposes.
'2 It is possible that in some interpleader cases the state courts could exercise a quasi in rem
jurisdiction over all the claimants. See Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d

960 (1957).
1362 Stat. 391 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §1335 (1950).
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cated only once. There is, however, nothing comparable to the Fdderal Interpleader Act's nation-wide process in impleader and if the court hearing the
original case cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over thae party to be impleaded, the action will proceed without him and the defendant will have no
safeguard against inconsistent judgments.
To the parties making use of these multiple-party devices they may mean the
difference between reasonable and exorbitant expense or the difference between
enjoying or being deprived of legal relief.15 The fact that the restrictions on the
in personam jurisdiction of the courts, which limit the usefulness of all these
devices except interpleader, are a natural result of the historical development
of this branch of the law'" in no way makes palatable the hardships caused.
II
It has been suggeted that these hardships could be alleviated by having the
federal court system adjudicate all multiple-party actions not justiciable in state
courts.' 7 There is little reason to doubt the power of Congress to pass legislation
14 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 14 governs the impleader situation in the federal courts. The court
may or may not, at its discretion, force a third-party defendant within the court's personal
jurisdiction to become a party to the action.
15To the country's overcrowded courts these devices allow consolidation of several potential
suits into one.
16 The early view of the Supreme Court was that for jurisdictional purposes each state
"possess[ed] and exercise[d] the authority of independent States.. . ." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 722 (1877). Thus each state could exercise jurisdiction over only those persons over
whom it had physical power (those found within its borders and therefore within reach of the
police power) or who owed allegiance to the state. Although the law of personal jurisdiction
changed and the limitations became less severe, it was not until 1945 in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), that the view that "[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is
physical power...." (Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90,91 [1917]), was expressly
disapproved by the Supreme Court. Previous to this case the Court had resorted to the "consent" (Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. (U.S.) 404 [1855]; St. Clair v. Cox, 106
U.S. 350 [1922]; Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 234 U.S.
93 [1917]), "presence" (New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U.S. 138
[1884]; Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U.S. 171 [1923]), and "doing
business" (International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 [1914]; Rosenberg Co. v.
Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 [19231), fictions to justify an expansion of the courts' personal
jurisdiction, all of which were consistent with the idea that jurisdiction is based on physical
power. The idea that an individual or corporation could be forced to consent to the personal
jurisdiction of the state courts was based on the false notion that their activities could be curtailed by the states. But false or not, it rested on a concept of state power. Likewise, if a corporation was "present" or "doing business" in a state it could be argued that it was within
the "power" of the state just as much as the individual found within its borders. Although the
Supreme Court disavowed the "power" theory in International Shoe, a vestige of that concept
remains in the rule that a state can exercise jurisdiction over only those who "have certain
minimum contacts" within the state. Hanson v. Denckla, 257 U.S. 235 (1958).
For a recent discussion of the development of the law of personal jurisdiction see Kurland,
The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam jurisdiction of State Courts
from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 569 (1958).
17 Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform,
7 Vand. L. Rev. 608 (1954).
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giving federal district courts jurisdiction over multiple-party suits involving
imperfect diversity and allowing these courts to exercise nation-wide service of
process. Both these provisions were incorporated in the Federal Interpleader
Act1 8 and are generally accepted today. 9 Venue requirements and transfer provisions 0 could assure the parties a convenient forum. It has been argued that
as long as the state courts are not adjudicating multiple-party cases, federal
diversity jurisdiction might be justified even in the eyes of the strictest states'
rights theorist.2'
It has also been suggested that Congress pass legislation requiring the states
"in appropriate cases" to give full faith and credit to "civil process served
anywhere in the United States" by a court in a sister state.2 2 Multiple-party
actions would seem to head the list of "appropriate cases" and if such legislation were coupled with an increased use of forum non conveniens in the state
courts, such a solution might be quite beneficial without undue harshness to
1s

62 Stat. 391 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §1335 (1950).

19It might be questioned whether the draftsmen of the Interpleader Act intended the courts
to exercise jurisdiction in those situations where there is less than absolute diversity among
claimants. The general diversity statute gives the federal courts jurisdiction over controversies
between "[c]itizens of different States," 62 Stat. 930 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. §1332
(Supp., 1958), and ever since Marshall's famous opinion in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch
(U.S.) 267 (1806), this statute has been held to require absolute diversity of citizenship between
the plaintiffs and defendants. Before the 1948 amendments to the Interpleader Act, it called
for jurisdiction in those cases where there were "two or more adverse claimants, citizens of
different states." The diversity section was amended in 1948 to read "two or more adverse
claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in Section 1332 of this title." Had the draftsmen of
the Act desired to make such a radical change in the law as to allow jurisdiction when there was
less than absolute diversity among the claimants they surely could have made their intent
clearer. Indeed, even Professor Chafee, a key figure in the passage of the Act, who believed that
"the test for success of the federal legislation is the frequency with which interpleader has
been granted in situations where state interpleader is impossible," Federal Interpleader Since

the Act of 1936, 49 Yale L. J. 377 (1940), stated in 1932 that when "the effect of
partial co-citizenship among the claimants.., is squarely raised it will probably bar relief
unless ancillary jurisdiction can be established." Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41
Yale L. J. 1134, 1169 (1932). But the courts were almost unanimous in their view that as this
was "remedial" legislation it should be broadly interpreted, and any diversity among the
claimants was held to be sufficient for jurisdictional purposes. Jurisdiction has even been
sustained when the stakeholder, one of the claimants and two of the three other joint claimants
were citizens of the same state, the only diversity existing between these parties and one of
three joint claimants. Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868 (C.A.5th, 1957). However, the Supreme
Court has never explicitly approved jurisdiction in imperfect diversity cases. But see Dugas v.
American Surety, 300 U.S. 414 (1937).
20 The present transfer provision for the federal courts is in 28 U.S.C.A. §1404(a). See
Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 405 (1955), for a
discussion of the conflict-of-laws problems arising out of this transfer provision.
21 Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7

Vand. L. Rev. 608, 622 (1954).
2
2Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Col. L.
Rev. 1, 22 (1945). Cook makes the same suggestion in the Logical and Legal Bases of the Con-

flict of Laws 99-100 (1949).
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defendant.3 Such legislation would, however, present complex constitutional
questions. Can Congress, under authorization of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, pass legislation enabling the states to exercise jurisdiction which would
violate due process in the absence of the statute? If so, how far can Congress go
without violating the Due Process Clause? Given legislation under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, it is possible that the Supreme Court would allow
in personam jurisdiction in multiple-party actions over individuals without contact in the forum state.
A similar solution might be provided by reciprocal state statutes.2 4 Each state
would agree to recognize the service of process of courts in the other states in
multiple-party actions and to enforce the judgments of those courts. These
statutes would be comparable to those now widely in force permitting extradition of witnesses in criminal actions, and which have recently been held by the
Supreme Court to be compatible with due process. 25 The statutes might also
provide that once a state acquires jurisdiction it would be free to transfer the
case to another state which is a more convenient place of trial, in much the
same way that transfer is now possible in the federal court system.2 1 It is questionable, however, whether a state would agree to a transfer provision allowing
the courts of another state to direct it to adjudicate a case. It is also questionable whether the states could increase their in personam jurisdiction in this
manner, for, unlike Congress, the states are given no power in this area by the
Constitution. But there is language in the recent opinion in New York v.
O'NeMll 27 which would support the? constitutionality of such statutes.
But there are two serious defects in these solutions. First, they require
legislation. (At least fifty independent legislative acts would be required for
the state statute solution.) It is unlikely that either Congress or the state
legislatures are sufficiently interested in the problem to act. Secondly, by looking at only one side of the issue these "solutions" are likely to create more problems than they sofve.2s
23

See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 405 (1955).

2

4E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. (1955) §§942.01-942.06.

25 New

York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
2672 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §1404(a) (1950).
27 359 U.S. 1 (1959). "The Supreme Court of Florida held that inasmuch as what was
ordered was to be carried on in a foreign jurisdiction, the Florida courts could not constitutionally be given jurisdiction to order it (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714). However, the
Florida courts had immediate personal jurisdiction over respondent by virtue of his presence
within that State. Insofar as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, this gave the Florida
courts constitutional jurisdiction to order an act even though that act is to be performed outside of the State." Id., at 8-9.
28 The Federal Interpleader Act, 62 Stat. 391 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §1335 (1950), is a good
example of a legislative "solution" in this field. See text following note 13 supra, for a discussion of the problems caused by the Act.
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It is true that present law, in making some "contact" within a state prerequisite to personal jurisdiction, overemphasizes the importance of adjudicating
in a convenient forum while failing to recognize the fact that in some cases the
inconveniences of adjudicating are outweighed by the desirability of finding
some forum in which to adjudicate the issue. Proposed changes in the law, however, tend to overemphasize the need for finding some forum in which to adjudicate multiple-party actions, while ignoring the fact that in a large country
there will be some cases in which the inconveniences of any forum will outweigh
the desirability of finding a forum in which to adjudicate. Transfer provisions
are of no benefit when no convenient forum exists, and the doctrine of forum non
conveniens has traditionally been used only in those situations in which a more
convenient forum is available.
III
Perhaps a solution may be effected by judicial decision rather than by legislative action. The courts and not the legislatures are immediately faced with
the problems in this area, and the courts, not the legislatures, have the flexible
means for weighing the desirability of adjudicating an issue against the desirability of restricting adjudications to convenient forums. A possible judicial
solution to the indispensable party situation would be to increase the scope of
the class action to cover situations where there are only a few parties. A strange
aspect of the present law is that a plaintiff may find it impossible to obtain
relief against two parties, both indispensable, who live in different parts of the
country, when, if he were claiming relief against numerous parties, he could
obtain it by initiating a class action.2 9 By expanding the scope of the class
action an adjudication against two defendants could be made as easy as an
adjudication against two hundred.
The solution, of course, would apply only to the joinder situation in which
there are indispensable parties. 0 Not only is a broader solution desirable--one
covering all multiple-party actions-but it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
would approve such expanded jurisdiction justified only by a change in terminology. A more direct solution would seem desirable, and the obvious one is to
eliminate the present "contact" limitation on personal jurisdiction.
In InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington l the Court repudiated the older
power concept of personal jurisdiction and replaced it with a "fairness" test.2
29See 3 Moore, Federal Practice §23 (2nd ed., 1948), and Multiparty Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874 (1958), for a discussion of the problems peculiar to the
class action, e.g., when it may be initiated and upon whom it is binding.
30 Only if the parties are "indispensable" it is certain that they will be bound, regardless of
their presence before the court, by the judgment in a class action. See 3 Moore, Federal Practice
§23 (2d ed., 1948).
"1326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2 See note 16 supra, for a discussion of the development of the law previous to International
Shoe.
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But the idea that a state could exercise jurisdiction over only those persons who
had some contact within the state-an idea with origins in the power conceptwas incorporated into this fairness criterion.
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he is not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradi33
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
It may be asked why "fair play and substantial justice" require that all persons
subjected to the personal jurisdiction of a state court have "certain minimum
contacts" with that state. Even if in some cases this limitation protects parties
from having to defend actions in distant forums, in other cases the limitation
serves no real purpose except to deprive the plaintiff of his legal remedy. The
relationship between fair play and state lines is often vague at best.
An examination of Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Hanson v.
Denckla,34 the most recent case upholding the "contact" limitation to the fairness test, helps to explain the Court's position. In that opinion the Chief
Justice stated:
[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend [towards more flexible rules governing in
personam jurisdiction] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts.... Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective statesA
The Court, then, did not have to wrestle with the proposition that the contact
doctrine is a rather arbitrary, one-sided way to protect a party from inconvenient litigation, for it justified the doctrine on other grounds. But what is
meant by the statement that the contact restrictions on personal jurisdiction
"are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
states"? Surely the Court was not referring to physical "power," for this was the
concept repudiated in InternationalShoe. Nor was the Court referring to restrictions placed on the states' personal jurisdiction by the fairness test, for
that test is a protection from "inconvenient or distant litigation" and these restrictions "are more than" that.
The only other conceivable explanation for this restriction is that it is a requirement of state sovereignty. "Sovereignty" is a difficult concept in relation
to independent nations. What "state sovereignty" entails presents equally
33International

34 357

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

U.S. 235 (1958).

"Id., at 250. It is open to question whether the dissent by Black, J., indicates that the
Court is unanimous in its view of the vitality of the contact doctrine or whether a minority
would discard it were the question squarely presented. "Of course we have not reached the
point where state boundaries are without significance, and I do not mean to suggest such a

view here, There is no need to do so," Id., at 260.
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difficult problems. But it may be agreed that a state is "sovereign," as that term
is used in our federal scheme of government, only if its citizens and the activities within the state are governed exclusively by the laws of that state and the
federal government. No state, then, can make laws governing the activities of
citizens of other states except to the extent to which those persons have contact
with the state. It is, therefore, important that in each controversy a rational
determination be made as to which state's substantive law governs it. But the
question of jurisdiction, of finding a forum in which to adjudicate a case, and
the question of which law should be applied are independent of each other.
Granted that Pennsylvania cannot pass laws governing New York citizens who
have had no contact with Pennsylvania, it does not seem to detract from New
York's "sovereignty" when a Pennsylvania court applies New York law when
adjudicating a controversy. State sovereignty should be protected by rules of
the conflicts of laws, not those concerning personal jurisdiction. 36 The contact
restrictions on the states' personal jurisdiction are justified, then, not by any
concept of state sovereignty, nor by the physical power or fairness concepts, nor
by any other concept yet articulated by the Court. 37 This is an area of the law
where "old dogma has been destroyed [but] new doctrine to replace it has not
been firmly fashioned." 3 8
As the law develops the Court will be faced with the choice of justifying the
contact doctrine or discarding it. The only justification for this limitation on the
states' personal jurisdiction is that it affords protection against distant, inconvenient litigation. When it is realized that this is the only justification, the
Supreme Court will have to decide whether there is more likelihood of "fair
play and substantial justice" with the contact limitation to the fairness doctrine
or without this limitation. The argument for the limitation must rest on the
protection it affords. The argument against it will point out that it equally
"protects" the residents of Gary, Indiana, and Los Angeles, California, from
having to defend a suit in Chicago, and that often the desirability of this pro36There is no question but that the problems in the area of conflict of laws are of great
magnitude and that by eliminating the contact doctrine the number of times these problems
arise will increase. For a recent discussion of these problems see Currie, The Constitution and
the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 9

(1958).
37 Nor do any of the standard justifiactions for federalism require this limitation. The oftrepeated arguments for federalism are: (1) a decentralized government is more efficient and a
greater safeguard against tyranical power than is a centralized government with an everexpanding bureaucracy; (2) local administrators have the greatest knowledge with which to
deal with local problems; and (3) the many governments within the nation make experimentation on a less than nation-wide scale possible, and critical comparisons can be made of the
various states' institutions. The defense of federalism in the Federalist is more on the negative
side-the various states will check evil influences before they permeate the country as a whole.
The Federalist Nos. 3, 9, 10, 51 (1894).

38Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction
of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. of Chi, L,Rev. 569, 623 (1958).
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tection is outweighed by the desirability of giving the plaintiff a forum in which
to adjudicate his claim, especially in the multiple-party actions.
In reply it will perhaps be urged that without the contact limitation a judge
might abuse his discretionary powers and apply the fairness test in such manner as to disregard the defendants' hardships in traveling great distances to the
forum." But to be weighed against this are benefits of greater range in the
courts' discretion. Unhampered by the contact limitation the judge in each
joinder action could weigh the fairness to all the parties in (1) proceeding with
the action in the absence of those parties not before the court, (2) asserting
personal jurisdiction over the absent parties and adjudicating the controversy
with all of them present, or (3) dismissing the action. 40 In an impleader action he
would be free to proceed without the absent third party or exercise personal
jurisdiction over him. In an interpleader action he would be free to exercise
jurisdiction over the various claimants or dismiss the action. In each case the
judge would consider the nature of the dispute, the geographical locations and
interests of the parties, and the availability of alternate forums. He would
make that decision which he believed would best promote."fair play and substkntial justice."'4
39The possibility of judicial abuse or indiscretion in this matter should not be ignored. Nor
is the right to appeal much of a safeguard, for the cost and inconvenience of defending one's
self before an appellate court can be just as great as that of defending one's self on the trial
level. On the other hand, the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction over individuals is not new
to American courts. They exercise jurisdiction today in impleader, permissive joinder and
permissive intervention cases. Further, they exercise a discretionary jurisdiction over those
cases in which they determine whether or not an absent party is "indispensable" to the action.
The possibility of abuse would not seem to be much greater if the court's discretion extended
to parties residing outside the state. The possibility that does exist might be lessened by the
courts fixing costs at a higher level, much like the English courts do, thus deterring plaintiffs
from bringing nuisance suits. This deterrent would not be great, however, in the case of the
impecunious plaintiff.
Perhaps the possibility of abuse is great enough to justify the retention of the contact requirement in two-party suits while dropping the requirement only in multiple-party actions.
There is surely some strength in the position that in two-party actions, where some forum always exists and there is little danger of multiple suits, the plaintiff, who desires to change
existing relationships, should have to go to the trouble of finding a forum convenient to the
defendant.
40 In the case of the defendant desiring to join plaintiffs to an action to avoid the possibility
of multiple suits, e.g., the mineral rights case discussed in text at note 8 supra, the courts
might feel more free to find the other plaintiffs "indispensable" to the suit when such a finding
did not mean automatic dismissal.
41The amount in dispute might well be one of the factors to be considered. A party might
in all fairness be asked to travel across the country to defend a claim for $10,000 when it would
be unfair to make him do so if the claim were for only $500. This factor was apparently given
little consideration when the Federal Interpleader Act was drafted.

